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LITTLE ROCK AND THE LEGACY OF DRED SCOTT 
john a. powell* AND STEPHEN MENENDIAN** 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1954, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its celebrated 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education declaring that the doctrine of 
“separate but equal” announced in Plessy v. Ferguson1 was thereafter 
unconstitutional.2  In spite of this ringing pronouncement, Southern school 
boards were slow to take up the task of disestablishing state mandated racial 
segregation.  Little Rock, Arkansas, was no exception. 
In 1957, the Little Rock School District announced a gradual plan of 
integration.3  Integration was to begin in the 1957–1958 school year at the 
senior high school level and trickle downward, although no target dates were 
set for further integration.4  Most critically, the plan allowed only a handful of 
Black students to attend White schools.5  When local leaders and 
representatives of the NAACP were unable to convince the school district to 
implement a more expansive integration plan, they filed a lawsuit in U.S. 
district court styled Aaron v. Cooper on behalf of the parents of thirty-three 
Black children.6  The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the integration plan devised by the school board was reasonable.7  
Rather than pursue further appeals, the plaintiffs began to work with the school 
 
* john a. powell is the Williams Chair in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, Moritz College of Law, 
the Ohio State University and Executive Director, Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and 
Ethnicity, the Ohio State University. 
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 1. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 2. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 3. Judge Wiley Branton, Jr., A Date with History: Wiley A. Branton and the Path to Cooper 
v. Aaron, 42 ARK. LAW. 20, 22 (2007). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 22–24. 
 7. Aaron v. Cooper, 143 F. Supp. 855, 866 (E.D. Ark. 1956), aff’d, 243 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 
1957). 
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district to identify Black students who could enter Central High at the start of 
the school year.8 
Out of two hundred initially eligible candidates, only nine Black students, 
with the consent of their parents, were willing to integrate Central High.9  
These nine brave children were harassed, threatened, and subjected to various 
reprisals.10  On September 2, 1957, Governor Orval Faubus dispatched the 
Arkansas National Guard to surround Central High to prevent the Little Rock 
Nine from entering the school.11  Two days later, the Little Rock Nine were 
barred from entering Central High School.12  After a request from the U.S. 
Justice Department, the district court enjoined the governor and the Guard 
from “preventing the attendance of Negro children at Central High School.”13  
Although the governor withdrew the National Guard, he had successfully 
moved the public to join in defiance.14  Hundreds of protestors, mostly White 
parents, stood in front of the schools screaming and yelling epithets.15 
On September 25, 1957, President Eisenhower dispatched federal troops to 
ensure compliance with the federal court order.16  The plaintiffs and the school 
board ratcheted up the legal battle until the Supreme Court issued its ruling, 
Cooper v. Aaron, on September 12, 1958.17  In its decision, the Supreme Court 
unanimously reaffirmed Brown and declared that the U.S. Constitution was 
absolutely controlling and binding on state officials in spite of any state law or 
state action to the contrary.18 
This symposium on Cooper v. Aaron19 commemorates the fiftieth 
anniversary of the Supreme Court’s intervention in the Little Rock crisis.  The 
symposium speakers, including the keynote speaker, underscored the ways in 
which the Little Rock crisis formed a critical juncture on the path to fulfilling 
the promise of Brown.20  Little Rock was a turning point in public support for 
integration, exposing through the malevolence and terror, threatened and 
 
 8. Branton, supra note 3, at 24. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Branton, supra note 3, at 24 (citing Aaron v. Cooper, 156 F. Supp. 220 (1957)). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 237 F. Supp. 2d 988, 
998 (E.D.Ark. 2002) (noting that the nine students entered Central High School despite “the 
threatening mob of whites”). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Branton, supra note 3, at 24–25 (discussing the school district’s request for a delay 
in further implementation of the plan on account of the preceding events). 
 18. Id. at 25 (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1958)). 
 19. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 20. David A. Strauss, Little Rock and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065 
(2008). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] LITTLE ROCK AND THE LEGACY OF DRED SCOTT 1155 
exacted, on nine teenagers the severity of Jim Crow segregation.  As important 
as Cooper may be on the path from Brown, the stream of law that flows out of 
Brown did not originate there.  Nor does the exercise of judicial authority in 
Cooper pertain solely to the issues raised in Brown.  Viewing Cooper from the 
trajectory of Brown conveys an incomplete picture of the Supreme Court’s 
intervention in Little Rock.  Brown is but one element of a greater 
jurisprudential whole, of which Cooper speaks directly upon. 
In this Article we suggest that understanding the full significance of the 
Supreme Court’s intervention in Cooper requires us to go back further than 
Brown or even Plessy.  We must situate Cooper v. Aaron in the context of 
another constitutional crisis and its ultimate resolution.  As we reflect upon the 
fiftieth anniversary of the Little Rock Nine and the subsequent Supreme Court 
decision, we must also reflect upon another anniversary, the one hundred and 
fiftieth anniversary of the notorious Dred Scott 21 decision.  Many of the 
fundamental issues raised in Cooper hark back to the Civil War.  In some ways 
we are still negotiating the outcome, at least the outcome of the resolution, of 
that great conflict.  The principal recognition accorded the Dred Scott case in 
the American mythos is its role in “precipitating” the Civil War.22  
Undoubtedly, the decision aggravated a bitter, long-standing sectional conflict.  
In order to fully understand the transformation wrought by the Civil War and 
its aftermath, we must return to Dred Scott.  The Dred Scott case serves as a 
focal point, speaking to the elemental questions of citizenship, membership, 
and American identity and community that frame the contested resolution of 
the Civil War through the Reconstruction Amendments.  In Cooper, even more 
so than Brown, we reach a judicial apogee, with the Court striving to reclaim 
the slumbering spiritual commitments of the Reconstruction Amendments. 
In Part I, we sketch the contours of the Dred Scott opinion and examine the 
race line Chief Justice Taney inscribed into the definition of American 
citizenship by announcing that persons of African descent, regardless of their 
status, could never become American citizens.  In a modern democratic state, 
citizenship is the fundamental form of membership in society.  As the 
expositor of the Constitution, the Supreme Court played a symbolic role in 
shaping American identity by helping constitute and reaffirm a racialized 
understanding of American citizenship. 
 
 21. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
 22. For a thoughtful discussion on whether Dred Scott helped “precipitate” the Civil War, 
see DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND 
POLITICS 561–67 (1978).  Fehrenbacher concludes that the Dred Scott decision is better 
understood as a “conspicuous and perhaps an integral part of a configuration of events and 
conditions that did produce enough changes of allegiance to make a political revolution and 
enough intensity of feeling to make that revolution violent.”  Id. at 561. 
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Part II examines the work of the Reconstruction Amendments and their 
relationship to Dred Scott.  The Reconstruction Amendments were a sustained 
attempt to reverse Dred Scott and sweep former slaves into the political 
community, both as a matter of law, but also as a matter of social and political 
fact.  In the process, the Reconstruction Amendments redefined and reordered 
the relationship between the national government and the states, with 
implications for the meaning of national citizenship.  The post-Reconstruction 
Supreme Court systematically reversed much of this work in a trio of decisions 
that hollowed out the Fourteenth Amendment, with practical and 
jurisprudential consequences that are evident today. 
Part III ties the debate over the meaning of the Reconstruction 
Amendments to the symbolic impact of the Supreme Court’s intervention in 
Cooper and beyond.  Cooper is more than a reaffirmation of the principles in 
Brown, it is also a statement about the limits of individual choice in a 
democratic community.  The Reconstruction Amendments and the Civil War 
itself rejected the claim by the White community of a right to secede from 
communal relations.  The continuing struggle over voluntary school integration 
plans and the de jure/de facto divide is the most recent iteration of this debate. 
Part IV describes the resegregation trends in American society and will 
pick up the thread of integration and citizenship in the debate in Parents 
Involved.  Five decades after Brown, schools are resegregating along racial 
lines.  At a time of growing international dependence when the United States is 
increasingly multi-racial, our society is fragmenting.  There is a revived debate 
over the importance of integration, with many feeling integration exhaustion.  
Integration, as we have known it, has been misconceived.  It is not about how 
well students learn or test scores, it is primarily about citizenship and how 
students perceive themselves and their community and the values that an 
integrated education fosters. 
I.  SHADOW OF DRED SCOTT 
There are perhaps few, if any, Supreme Court cases in American 
constitutional history that have the scope of purview and breadth of implication 
as Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott.  Substantively, the opinion of 
the Chief Justice addresses issues as wide-ranging and important as the 
relationship between the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation, the 
geographic extent of the Bill of Rights, the limit of congressional power, the 
constitutional basis for territorial expansion, comity between the states, the 
nature of the Federal Union, and the rights of private property.23  The opinion 
of the Chief Justice also defined the legal status of Indian tribes, the power of 
naturalization, and clarified the meaning and criteria of citizenship both state 
 
 23. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 6. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] LITTLE ROCK AND THE LEGACY OF DRED SCOTT 1157 
and national.24  The Dred Scott opinions themselves add up to nearly 240 
pages.25  To say that this case is long and complex is a hyperbolic 
understatement.  It was only the second case in American history to overturn 
an act of Congress and the first to overturn a major congressional act.26  In 
some respects, its zealous assertion of judicial review is as important as 
Marbury v. Madison.27 
Although there remain lingering questions about their historical accuracy,28 
the facts can be summarized as follows: Peter Blow, a native of Virginia, gave 
up farming in Alabama and moved his family and six slaves to St. Louis in 
1830 to operate a boarding house known as the Jefferson Hotel.29  The 
boarding house was unsuccessful and his health and the health of his family 
deteriorated with his business.30  Some time between 1830 and 1833, the estate 
of Peter Blow sold Dred Scott to Dr. John Emerson, a medical officer at the 
nearby barracks. 31  In December 1833, Emerson was appointed assistant 
surgeon in the U.S. Army and commissioned at Fort Armstrong in Illinois, a 
free state.32  Emerson took Dred Scott with him as a personal servant at the 
Army post.33  Three years later, the Army vacated Fort Armstrong and 
Emerson was transferred to Fort Snelling, near the eventual location of St. 
Paul, Minnesota, then a part of the Wisconsin territory.34  Slavery was 
forbidden in the territory by the Missouri Compromise.35 
Contrary to the facts stipulated in Dred Scott v. Sandford, Emerson was 
transferred back to St. Louis in October, 1837, and then again to Fort Jesup in 
western Louisiana a month later.36  Although Dred Scott and his wife Harriet 
remained at Fort Snelling in the employ of one or more of its officers, they 
later made the journey to Louisiana in the spring of 1838.37  After a few 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393–633. 
 26. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 4 (“The Dred Scott decision . . . was the Supreme 
Court’s first invalidation of a major federal law.”). 
 27. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803).  Under U.S. law, courts not only apply law, but also play 
a role in interpreting law both as a matter of the judicial function and as a matter of judicial 
review.  Id at 177. 
 28. There is some debate over whether the facts may have been glossed over or even 
fabricated to make a model test case.  See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 269–76. 
 29. Id. at 239. 
 30. Id. 
 31. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 239–40. 
 32. Id. at 240. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 244. 
 35. Id. 
 36. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 244–45. 
 37. Id. at 245. 
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months in Louisiana, Emerson requested a transfer to return to Fort Snelling.38  
The Surgeon General granted his request, and that fall Emerson traveled with 
his new wife, Eliza Irene Sanford, and the Scotts to the Wisconsin Territory.39  
In the spring of 1840, Emerson was transferred to Florida where the Seminole 
War was still in progress.40  Mrs. Emerson and the Scotts remained behind in 
St. Louis.41  After honorable discharge, Emerson returned to St. Louis and then 
later to Davenport, a new town in the Iowa territory, where he began to build a 
house.42  Soon thereafter, Emerson’s health began to deteriorate.43  Dr. 
Emerson died in late December of 1843, leaving behind a wife and infant 
daughter.44  Thus began a decade of litigation.45 
In 1846, the Scotts filed petitions in the Missouri circuit court in St. Louis, 
“summarizing the circumstances of their residence on free soil” and seeking 
permission to bring suit against Mrs. Emerson to establish their freedom.46  
The case worked its way up and down the state courts.  By the early 1850s, the 
Scotts’ attorneys were informed that Mrs. Emerson had sold the Scotts to her 
brother, John F.A. Sanford, who was then a resident of New York.47 
Dred Scott sued Sanford in federal court, asserting his freedom in the form 
of an “action of trespass.”48  The federalist framework accounted for the 
possibility that citizens of a state may wish to pursue cases in federal court 
rather than in the courts of their home state.  In order to ensure the primacy of 
state courts in cases most relevant to state law or state matters, the Constitution 
limited federal jurisdiction to those circumstances where federal resolution of a 
case was either necessary or consistent with state comity.49  One such 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 245–46. 
 40. Id. at 247. 
 41. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 247. 
 42. Id. at 247–48. 
 43. Id. at 248. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Dr. Emerson left a life estate to his wife and the remainder to his daughter.  Id.  Although 
Emerson had appointed two executors for his will, including Mrs. Emerson’s brother John F.A. 
Sanford, the administrator appointed by the court was Alexander Sanford, Mrs. Emerson’s father.  
Id. at 248.  It is unclear what happened to the Scotts during the next few years, but it is doubtful 
that Dr. Emerson conveyed them to John Sanford as stipulated in the facts before the Supreme 
Court.  See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 398 (1856).  It seems that the Scotts were 
in the service of Mrs. Emerson’s brother-in-law, Captain Bainbridge, until 1846.  
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 249. 
 46. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 250. 
 47. Id. at 270. 
 48. Id. at 276. 
 49. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1: 
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this 
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
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circumstance is known as “diversity jurisdiction,” where the parties are citizens 
of different states.50  The Framers recognized that in a case or controversy 
between citizens of different states, the state forum of a party’s citizenship 
might be a more receptive and favorable tribunal.  Since both parties would 
presumably wish to try the case in their own state courts, diversity jurisdiction 
allows diverse citizens to remove their case to federal court, an ostensiby 
neutral forum. 
The question before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether Dred Scott 
was a citizen of the State of Missouri.51  If he was a citizen of Missouri, then 
the federal court would have diversity jurisdiction to hear his case against 
Sanford, a citizen of New York.52  If Dred Scott was a slave, then he was not a 
citizen and the Court would be unable to hear his case.53  If the federal courts 
lacked jurisdiction, the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court would be left 
standing, which had decided against the Scotts.54 
The precise character of national citizenship and the relationship between 
state and national citizenship was an ongoing debate whose terms were cast 
against a backdrop of growing sectional crises in the middle decades of the 
nineteenth century. 55  Southern spokesmen, often responding to the assertion 
that Blacks were entitled the privileges and immunities of citizenship provided 
by Article IV of the Constitution, one of the few places where the word 
“citizen” was written into the Constitution, developed and advanced a theory 
of citizenship in which national citizenship was conditioned upon state 
citizenship.56  The implication of this theory was that Blacks in the South could 
not claim national citizenship since they were not citizens in those states.  
Many Southerners went even further and claimed that Blacks could not be 
citizens at all, as understood by the U.S. Constitution, since they were not part 
of the sovereign people who founded the nation, and therefore could claim no 
 
Consuls;―to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which 
the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States; 
between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different 
States;―between Citizens of the same State claiming Land under Grants of different 
States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or 
Subjects. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 400 (1856). 
 52. See id. 
 53. See id. 
 54. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 264. 
 55. “The nature of citizenship, state and national, and whether it included free Negroes, 
remained unsettled issues when the Dred Scott case reached the Supreme Court. . . . the general 
tendency was to regard state citizenship as primary, with United States citizenship deriving from 
it.”  Id. at 71 (internal citation omitted). 
 56. U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all 
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”). 
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protection as such under the Constitution.57  This theory blossomed into legal 
doctrine under Dred Scott. 
In the course of delivering his momentous opinion, Chief Justice Taney 
proclaimed that a person of African descent—even if born free in a state that 
treated him as a full and equal citizen—was not and could never become a 
citizen of the United States.58  In Chief Justice Taney’s opinion, the language 
of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States 
could not have intended to include the enslaved African race.59  Both 
instruments were formed for the benefit and protection of the people of the 
United States, those who were “members of the . . . political communities in 
the several States.”60  Thus, because the “enslaved African race . . . formed no 
part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration[,]” they could not 
enjoy the benefit or protection of it.61 
Many scholars and commentators express puzzling confusion in their 
analysis of what the Dred Scott case means with respect to race.  Part of the 
confusion stems from the fact that too often this question is framed in terms of 
the personal views or moral character of the Chief Justice and his associates.62  
The implication seems to be that if we could discover whether Chief Justice 
Taney was a racist, then we could know whether or not Dred Scott decision 
was an expression of racial bigotry or simply the faithful application of 
precedent by an honest jurist.  This curious impulse to locate the racial 
implications of Dred Scott in the personal beliefs of one man, or even a few, or 
in the consequence of the decision for Dred Scott and his family misses the 
larger racial context. 
There were numerous ways that the Court could have decided Dred Scott 
differently on the basis of precedent or finer legal distinctions, under many of 
which the Dred Scott decision would have been little more than a forgotten 
footnote in history.  On the citizenship question, the Court could have decided 
that all free Blacks were citizens of the United States, that free Blacks were 
citizens of the United States in states that recognized Black citizenship, or that 
free born, free Blacks were citizens while slave born, free Blacks were not.63  
 
 57. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 72. 
 58. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 404. 
 59. Id. at 410. 
 60. Id. at 410–11. 
 61. Id. at 410. 
 62. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 560.  This impulse is consistent with the dominant 
understanding of racism as an individualistic phenomenon.  See john a. powell, Structural 
Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John Calmore, 86 N.C. L. REV. 791 (2008). 
 63. A variation of the latter formulation underpins one of the major holdings of the much 
praised dissenting opinion of Justice Curtis.  Justice Curtis’s much praised dissent would have 
freed the Scotts solely on the technical legal ground that the Court could only review the facts in 
the plea of abatement in determining the jurisdictional question of Dred Scott’s citizenship.  
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In each case the consequence for the Scotts would have been the same: 
slavery.64  The Court could have even avoided the citizenship question 
altogether by extending and applying the Strader doctrine,65 which would have 
deferred to the state courts to decide the Scotts’ status.66  This, too, would have 
left the Scotts in slavery.67 
Chief Justice Taney opinion ultimately turns less on the territory question 
that enflamed the sectional crisis, questions of interstate comity or even the 
heated issue of slavery itself.  Chief Justice Taney’s opinion, above all, turned 
on race.  It inscribed a hard race line into the definition of American 
citizenship.  Whether born free in a state where Blacks enjoyed state 
 
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 405–07.  Since the plea itself established no facts inconsistent 
with Dred Scott being a United States citizen, he was entitled to bring suit in federal court.  Id. at 
407.  For Justice Curtis, only free Blacks born in states recognizing them as citizens were also 
citizens of the United States.  Id. at 407–08.  Had the fact that Dred Scott was born in Virginia 
been included in the plea of abatement, then Justice Curtis’s reasoning would have left the Scotts 
in slavery. 
 64. During oral argument before the Supreme Court, Sanford’s attorney, Henry Geyer, 
carved a subtle distinction between free-born Blacks and slave-born Blacks.  He argued that 
“citizens of the United States” as understood in Article Three, Section Two (the diverse-
citizenship clause), of the Constitution were either born to that status (having been born in a free 
state) or acquired it by naturalization under federal law or treaty.  Slaves who were later 
manumitted or discharged from bondage could not, therefore, acquire that status.  Id. at 296. 
 65. Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850).  The Supreme Court dismissed a claim 
for freedom by slave musicians who had been taken into a free state for a brief trip.  Id at 93.  The 
jurisdictional question was basically whether the forum state had the right to apply its own law or 
whether it could be compelled to apply the law of another state.  Id. at 94.  The specific issue 
presented was whether the emancipatory effect of the free state’s law would be enforced 
extraterritorially by federal power, or whether the slave in returning to the slaveholding state 
reverted totally to its jurisdiction.  Id. at 93.  Chief Justice Taney’s opinion for the Court 
enshrined the principle of reversion, a jurisdictional principle which holds that upon return from a 
free state, the slave’s status depends upon the law of the jurisdiction to which they returned.  See 
id. at 94.  The slaveholding state then has the option to decide whether slavery reattaches or not.  
The Strader decision of 1850 amounted to a form of judicial restraint.  It would leave it to the 
individual states to determine whether return from a free state results in freedom or a return to 
slavery. 
 66. This seemed to be the initial formulation of the Court.  Upon re-argument, however, the 
issues of territoriality and citizenship took additional significance, and the Justices felt compelled 
to rule on these issues based upon heightened public expectations.  FEHRENBACHER, supra note 
22, at 306. 
 67. Initially, the Missouri state courts had decided on behalf of the Scotts.  By the time that 
the case had risen to the Missouri Supreme Court, the sectional discord had intensified, and the 
ideological and political composition of that tribunal abruptly shifted.  In 1852, the Missouri 
Supreme Court issued  a 2–1 opinion that Dred Scott was still a slave.  Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 
576 (1852).  Applying Strader, the decision of the state of Missouri would control.  Id. at *5 
(NEED PAGE NUMBER FROM HARD COPY).  This was the substance of Justice Nelson’s 
concurring opinion in Dred Scott.   Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 457–68 (1856) 
(Nelson, J., concurring). 
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citizenship or under the whip of the plantation South, it made little difference.  
All Blacks, whether free or slave, stood on the same ground.68  In short, Dred 
Scott is about whether Black people could ever become citizens and members 
of the political community. 
Although the term “citizen” is Latin in origin,69 the idea of citizenship first 
emerged in ancient Greece around 600–700 BCE.70  The Greek conception of 
citizenship was understood as active membership of and participation in the 
body politic.71  This conception of the citizen was preceded by and contingent 
upon the development of the polis, or the Greek city state’s political 
community.72  In every human society, people arrange themselves in groups 
organized by some common-unity, whether it is religious, ethnic, linguistic, 
geographic a combination thereof, or something else entirely.  Athens was the 
first place that a political community emerged based on the principle of 
sharing in the operation of common affairs, as distinctive from other forms of 
community organization.73 
Membership is the most important good that human beings distribute to 
one another in a community.74  Communities of people extend rights and 
privileges to members that are not granted to non-members.  In that way, 
membership informs all other distributive choices: “it determines with whom 
we make those choices, from whom we require obedience and collect taxes, 
[and] to whom we allocate goods and services.”75  It follows that membership 
is prior in importance even to freedom.76 Without membership, no freedoms 
will be established, recognized, or protected. 
To be part of a political community is not just a distributive matter, it is 
also a constitutive matter.  The distribution of membership shapes meaning for 
both individuals and the community as a collective.  The terms and boundaries 
of membership delimit how members mutually describe and perceive 
themselves and their community, an understanding that is shaped by those who 
are excluded.  In that way, membership in a community distributes identity.  
 
 68. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 342. 
 69. PAUL BARRY CLARKE, CITIZENSHIP 4 (1994) (pointing out that the term citizen derives 
from the Latin word civitas). 
 70. Id.  According to Clarke, the idea of the citizen was first expressed in Athens as a result 
of an economic crisis.  Solon, the ruler of Athens, promulgated laws that expanded the political 
community as an answer to calls for land redistribution and an anti-aristocratic movement.  Id. at 
5–6.  Orlando Patterson gives a much richer account, see ORLANDO PATTERSON, FREEDOM IN 
THE MAKING OF WESTERN CULTURE, 72–77 (1991). 
 71. CLARKE, supra note 69, at 4.   
 72. Id. at 4. 
 73. See id. at 5–6. 
 74. Id. at 6. 
 75. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 31 (1983). 
 76. See generally john a. powell, The Needs of Members in a Legitimate Democratic State, 
44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 969 (2004). 
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To be denied membership in a community is to be denied personhood by the 
community.  Even tribal societies have membership, and being an alien to that 
community is a dishonor associated with social death.77  When faced with exile 
from the polis or death, Socrates took poison rather than be denied 
personhood.78 
The rise of the nation-state created a new political space for personhood 
(and membership) rooted in citizenship.  In modern nation-states, the principal 
way that the political community is constituted is through the nation unit.  
Members under this arrangement are given the status of “citizen.”79 
When citizenship was granted universally, based upon liberal notions of the 
enlightenment, personhood became a presumption bestowed to all citizens at 
birth, and revoked when they failed to live up to that measure.  Yet, for most of 
that time, personhood was bestowed to limited segments of the populace, those 
persons considered citizens.80 
As the expositor of the Constitution, the Supreme Court plays a public and 
symbolic role in articulating and policing the meaning and content of 
citizenship.  In Dred Scott, the Court was constituting or reaffirming a 
particular understanding of citizenship and Whiteness.  By declaring that Black 
people could not be citizens of the United States, it constituted citizenship as a 
salient feature of Whiteness and vice versa.  In a sense, Chief Justice Taney 
and his brethren were active participants in the social construction of White 
identity.81  Being White meant that you could become part of the political 
community. 
From the outset, American nationality contained a racial component. The 
Declaration of Independence’s claim that “all men are created equal” was 
anything but self-evident.82  The term “men” excluded women and slaves.  The 
Naturalization Act of 1790 restricted U.S. citizenship to “free White 
 
 77. See PATTERSON, supra note 70, at 13 (discussing the Tupinamba of pre-European South 
America). 
 78. CLARKE, supra note 69, at 7. 
 79. As John Rawls describes: “Since ancient Greece, both in philosophy and in law, the 
concept of the person has been that of someone who can take part in, or play a role in, social life, 
and hence who can exercise and respect its various rights and duties.”  JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS 
FAIRNESS 24 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001).  This normative construction of personhood has been 
predominant in Western history for over two millennia. 
 80. john a. powell, The Needs of Members in a Legitimate Democratic State, 44 SANTA 
CLARA LAW REVIEW 969, 987 (2004). 
 81. Although we recognize that the categories “White” and “Black” are socially constructed, 
we pay little attention as to how they are constructed.  The notion that we sort or distribute 
benefits and burdens according to natural categories is demonstrably false.  We create and 
recreate those identities.  Here, Chief Justice Taney was an active participant in the construction 
of Whiteness. 
 82. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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persons.”83  For eight decades, only persons that were White could be 
naturalized as American citizens.  In the final decades of the nineteenth century 
and early decades of the twentieth century, there were many court cases 
moving the boundary of Whiteness with ramifications for the political 
community.84 
One way to understand Dred Scott is that it is about membership in our 
imagined community.85  More particularly, could free Blacks or slaves be 
considered part of this community?  Slavery helped shape the identity and 
sense of self of all Americans by “render[ing] blacks all but invisible to those 
imagining the American community.”86  Segregation under Jim Crow and later 
embraced in Plessy was an extension of the same imagining.  The division of 
membership, of structuring the national community along racial lines is a 
legacy we struggle with today.  One only need reflect on our hyper-segregated 
and highly impoverished urban areas and coincident White suburban enclaves 
to see that there is a sense that these communities do not share a common 
unity.  Residential segregation curtails the experience of community for people 
of different races, and is perhaps the most important factor contributing to 
racial inequality today.  The Civil Rights Movement is essentially an effort to 
make a practical and legal claim about membership and the rights that attach to 
membership. 
When Abraham Lincoln penned the famous words, “Four score and seven 
years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent, a new nation, conceived 
in Liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal,” 87 
 
 83. Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795). 
 84. See, e.g., United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898) (affirming the 
“ancient and fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the territory” as a constitutional 
mandate); Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 223 (1897) (holding that federal jurisdiction was proper 
over a United States citizen’s claims against an Indian tribal member when the member’s nation 
refused to recognize him and declined jurisdiction); United States v. Balsara, 180 F. 694, 696 (2d 
Cir. 1910) (granting naturalization to national from India when the language of the statute 
referred to persons of the “White race,” as distinguished from the “black, red, yellow, or brown 
races”); In re Mudarri, 176 F. 465, 466 (D. Mass. 1910) (ruling Syrian national was a member of 
the “White race” for naturalization purposes); In re Ellis, 179 F. 1002, 1004 (D. Or. 1910) 
(holding the same for Turkish national); In re Halladjian, 174 F. 834 (D. Mass. 1909) (holding the 
same for Armenian national); Jennings v. Webb, 8 App. D.C. 43, 53 (App. D.C. 1896) (finding 
that a son of a former slave was entitled to the rights of inheritance passing among citizens). 
 85. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).  The idea of communities as imagined 
originates from Benedict Anderson’s anthropological understanding of nationalism, where a 
nation “is an imagined community—and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign.”  
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF 
NATIONALISM 6 (1991). 
 86. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 38 (1998). 
 87. Abraham Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg 
(Nov. 19, 1863). 
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Lincoln was harkening back to ideals contained in the Declaration of 
Independence, not the Constitution.  President Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address 
implicitly criticized the Constitution because its incorporation of slavery 
contradicted the commitment to liberty and equality.88  According to Chief 
Justice Taney, the terms “citizen” and “people” were interchangeable.89  If 
Lincoln was to realize the claim to equality announced in the Declaration, it 
would mean nothing less than a reconstitution of the “people” in, “We The 
People.”90  The Civil War by itself could not accomplish this.  Lincoln was 
calling for a new Constitution. 
II.  A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM 
Although the events of the Civil War brought an end to slavery as a 
legalized, social relation, Taney’s racial theory of citizenship remained 
undisturbed as legal precedent.  The first post-war Congress took aim at Dred 
Scott by legislating the principle of birthright citizenship in the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866: 
Be it enacted . . . That all persons born in the United States and not subject to 
any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be 
citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, 
without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary 
servitude . . . .91 
 
 88. It was not simply that the Constitution as expounded upon by Chief Justice Taney 
protected slavery and the slave interest in the sectional conflict; many provisions in the original 
document were pro-slavery. 
Although the word slavery does not appear in the Constitution, many provisions 
were included for the purpose of protecting it.  The divide over slavery and the 
Constitution created a structure in which the states became the primary political 
units and retained wide authority over internal matters.  As such, the federal 
structure, and the limited federal government erected by the Constitution, 
“insulated slavery in the states from outside interference . . . .”  Article I 
temporarily barred Congress from acting to end the importation of slaves.  Article 
IV, section 2 placed an affirmative duty on free states to return fugitive slaves to 
their place of service, drawing even those states that opposed slavery into the 
control stratum.  Article V prohibited any Amendment seeking to reverse the 
bargain that protected the slave trade until 1808.  Most importantly, the 
Constitution’s Three-Fifth’s Clause ensured that slaveholders led the process of 
nation building until the election of Lincoln. 
john a. powell, The Race and Class Nexus: An Intersectional Perspective, 25 LAW 
& INEQ. 355, 363–64 (2007) (internal citations omitted). 
 89. Id. at 404. 
 90. CLARKE, supra note 69, at 20. 
 91. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 
(1991)). 
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And although, for one of the first instances in U.S. history, on April 9, 1866, 
the United States Congress overrode President Johnson’s veto, lingering 
doubts over the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act spurred the two-thirds 
majority in Congress to provide an incontrovertible constitutional foundation.92  
Two months later, Congress opened its proposed Fourteenth Amendment with 
unmistakably anti-Taney language: “All persons born or naturalized in the 
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside.”93  It was now absolutely clear that 
anyone born in the United States was a citizen thereof.  Thus, the Fourteenth 
Amendment overruled a key part of Dred Scott and left no constitutional doubt 
about it. 
The Fourteenth Amendment did more than ensure that former slaves or 
descendants of slaves enjoyed the status of national citizenship; it 
unequivocally rejected the theory of national citizenship as derivative of state 
citizenship.94  The Fourteenth Amendment not only granted and defined 
national citizenship, but it also defined state citizenship and the conditions 
under which it was acquired.  The greatly diminished agency of states in 
deciding for themselves who is a citizen is significant.  No state could 
henceforth bar any American citizen from choosing to become a state citizen.95  
A visitor from another state could become a citizen of another state by simply 
moving there, irrespective of what other residents of that state may think. 
If citizenship is the primary unit of membership in a democratic political 
community and if states no longer have a say in deciding who is a member and 
who is not, then it is more than simply citizenship that is redefined by the 
Fourteenth Amendment; the relationship between the states and the federal 
government is restructured as well.96  The following passage from the abstract 
 
 92. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 381 (2005). 
 93. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 94. It is critical that we not mislead here.  The notion that state citizenship was primary and 
that national citizenship was derivative was not a doctrine advanced by Chief Justice Taney.  
According to Taney, national citizenship was created by the Constitution at the time of its 
framing.  Although the definition of state and national citizenship and the relationship between 
the two had not come before the Court until Dred Scott, there was a tendency to regard state 
citizenship as primary, even in Northern circles.  See supra note 56 and accompanying text.  Even 
Justice Curtis, a son of New England, assumed this view in his often praised dissent.  See infra 
note 136 and accompanying text.  It was not simply that Justice Curtis’s dissent was praised for 
its outcome, but it was lauded for the correctness of its legal determinations.  This demonstrates, 
we think, that the view of states being primary was not a doctrine limited to the South, but with 
notable exceptions, generally assumed. 
 95. Id. 
 96. CHARLES L. BLACK JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND 
UNNAMED 24 (1997). 
If, being such a citizen of the United States, you live in Texas, then the national law of 
this Amendment ordains that you are a citizen of Texas; Texas has nothing to say about 
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summarizing the argument of Mr. John A. Campbell, and Mr. J.Q.A. Fellows 
on behalf of the plaintiffs in error in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the first 
Supreme Court case to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, describes the 
transformation with an eloquence that cannot be justly paraphrased: 
It had been maintained from the origin of the Constitution . . . that the State 
was the highest political organization in the United States; that through the 
consent of the separate States the Union had been formed for limited purposes; 
that there was no social union except by and through the States, and that in 
extreme cases the several States might cancel the obligations to the Federal 
government and reclaim the allegiance and fidelity of its members.  Such were 
the doctrines of Mr. Calhoun, and of others; both those who preceded and 
those who have followed him. 
. . . . 
  . . . The doctrine of the “States-Rights party,” led in modern times by Mr. 
Calhoun, was, that there was no citizenship in the whole United States, except 
sub modo and by the permission of the States.  According to their theory the 
United States had no integral existence except as an incomplete combination 
among several integers. The fourteenth amendment struck at, and forever 
destroyed, all such doctrines.  It seems to have been made under an 
apprehension of a destructive faculty in the State governments.  It consolidated 
the several “integers” into a consistent whole.  Were there Brahmans in 
Massachusetts, “the chief of all creatures, and with the universe held in charge 
for them,” and Soudras in Pennsylvania, “who simply had life through the 
benevolence of the other,” this amendment places them on the same footing.  
By it the national principle has received an indefinite enlargement.  The tie 
between the United States and every citizen in every part of its own 
jurisdiction has been made intimate and familiar. To the same extent the 
confederate features of the government have been obliterated.  The States in 
their closest connection with the members of the State, have been placed under 
the oversight and restraining and enforcing hand of Congress.  The purpose is 
manifest, to establish through the whole jurisdiction of the United States ONE 
PEOPLE, and that every member of the empire shall understand and appreciate 
the fact that his privileges and immunities cannot be abridged by State 
authority; that State laws must be so framed as to secure life, liberty, property 
from arbitrary violation and secure protection of law to all.  Thus, as the great 
personal rights of each and every person were established and guarded, a 
 
the matter.  Not 10%, not 1%, just nothing.  . . . [T]he right to be and to call yourself a 
citizen of any State is not a right conferred by that State, but a right bindingly ordained as 
a matter of national constitutional law.  . . . 
This denial to each of the States of the right to choose its own citizens might be looked on 
now as just another nail in the coffin of the theory that our States are “sovereign.” 
Id. 
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reasonable confidence that there would be good government might seem to be 
justified.97 
The Post-Civil War Reconstruction Amendments reordered and remade 
our Constitution.  To refer to this grand trilogy as “Amendments” may imply a 
change too modest to describe their function.98  As Jefferson privately feared 
toward the end of his life, the experiment begun at the Constitutional 
Convention of 1786 came crashing down.99  The Constitution of 1787 was a 
constitutional order of state primacy, derivative national citizenship and 
limited federal government.  The Constitution of 1870 was a constitutional 
order of national primacy with derivative state citizenship and a greatly 
expanded role for the federal government, drawing into its protection 
fundamental liberties and immunities from state interference.  The 
 
 97. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 51–53 (1872). 
 98. Professor Akhil Reed Amar reiterates this point: 
The naked constitutional text misleads: A casual reader encounters a Thirteenth 
Amendment whose words seem to follow smoothly after the first seven Articles and the 
first twelve amendments, in one continuous constitutional tradition linking the Founders 
to their twenty-first -century posterity.  What the bare text does now show is the jagged 
gash between Amendments Twelve and Thirteen—a gash reflecting the fact that the 
Founders’ Constitution failed in 1861–65. 
AMAR, supra note 92, at 360. 
The first eleven amendments to the Constitution were intended to be checks and 
limitations upon the government which that instrument called into existence.  They had 
their origin in a spirit of jealousy on the part of the States, which existed when the 
Constitution was adopted.  The first ten were proposed in 1789 by the first Congress at its 
first session after the organization of the government.  The eleventh was proposed in 
1794, and the twelfth in 1803.  The one last mentioned regulates the mode of electing the 
President and Vice-President.  It neither increased nor diminished the power of the 
General Government, and may be said in that respect to occupy neutral ground.  No 
further amendments were made until 1865, a period of more than 60 years.  The thirteenth 
amendment was proposed by Congress on the 1st of February, 1865, the fourteenth on the 
16th of June, 1866, and the fifteenth on the 27th of February, 1869.  These amendments 
are a new departure, and mark an important epoch in the constitutional history of the 
country.  They trench directly upon the power of the States, and deeply affect those 
bodies.  They are, in this respect, at the opposite pole from the first eleven.  Fairly 
construed amendments may be said to rise to the dignity of a new Magna Charta. 
Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 124 (Swayne, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 99. Thomas Jefferson perhaps represents the sentiment of ambivalence that haunted 
Southern statesmen of the revolutionary generation.   Jefferson despised the institution of slavery, 
but his livelihood depended upon its continuation.  WINTHROP D. JORDAN, THE WHITE MAN’S 
BURDEN: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF RACISM IN THE UNITED STATES 166 (1974).  In his 
denunciation of slavery, Jefferson wrote “Indeed I tremble for my country when I reflect that God 
is just: that his justice cannot sleep for ever.”  THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
VIRGINIA 163 (William Peden, ed., 1955).  By the time of the Missouri Compromise, Jefferson 
had described the sectional crisis as a “fire bell in the night.”  FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 
111. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] LITTLE ROCK AND THE LEGACY OF DRED SCOTT 1169 
Reconstruction Amendments restructured and reconfigured both in fact and in 
spirit the relationship between the federal government and the states. 
The Constitution, fastened with the Fourteenth Amendment, does more 
than strengthen the national hand vis-à-vis the states; it was framed for a new 
people.  The Civil War and the Civil War Amendments gave birth to a new 
freedom but also a new political community.  In this sense, the Fourteenth 
Amendment does far more than simply amend the Constitution; it is a new act 
of constituting by redefining the content of phrase “We The People” in the 
preamble in expansive national terms and inclusively without regard to race.100 
But granting citizenship as a matter of law and bestowing it as a political 
fact is not necessarily the same thing.  Indisputably, Blacks could no longer be 
denied access to federal courts under the Article III, section 2, diversity of 
citizenship clause.  But to be free and Black in antebellum America had 
actually meant only enjoying a partial freedom by White standards.101  Post-
bellum declarations of personhood and formal, legal citizenship for freed 
slaves would ring false if they were not enforced as a matter of social and 
political practice. 
According to Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott, the reason that Blacks 
were not part of the political community was not simply a function of law, it 
was also a function of political culture and social norms.  Chief Justice Taney 
reasoned that the terms “people of the United States” and “citizens,” terms that 
he described as “synonymous,” did not encompass persons of African descent 
because they were not members of the “political body” who formed the 
“sovereignty” at the moment of constitutional framing.102  Justice Taney’s 
legal conclusion turns upon an investigation into the social relations between 
the races at the time of the founding.  Although he canvasses a raft of legal 
instruments, including a probing inquiry into the meaning of the Declaration of 
Independence’s assertion that “All men are created equal,”103 an inspection 
into the terms of colonial anti-miscegenation laws,104 the language of the 
Constitution itself with respect to the enslaved race,105 the laws of the states 
after the Revolution but before the framing of the Constitution,106 and further 
 
 100. Both elements of are significant.  “We The People” now clearly referred to more than the 
people of the various states, it unequivocally referred to the people of the United States as a 
single, political unit.  “We The People” had also been purged, in law, of the race line, the 
contradiction between the founding ideals and the long-standing racial order.  The national unity 
inspired by the war effort—Black soldiering and the moral imperatives that guided that war—
undoubtedly made such an imagined community easier to fathom. 
 101. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 581. 
 102. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 404 (1856). 
 103. Id. at 410. 
 104. Id. at 408–09. 
 105. Id. at 411. 
 106. Id. at 412–16. 
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congressional acts,107 the meaning he imputes to these instruments depends 
upon their particular social context: 
[Persons of African descent] had for more than a century before been regarded 
as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white 
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no 
rights which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might 
justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for his benefit.  He was bought and 
sold, and treated as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic, whenever a 
profit could be made by it.  This opinion was at that time fixed and universal in 
the civilized portion of the white race.  It was regarded as an axiom in morals 
as well as in politics, which no one thought of disputing, or supposed to be 
open to dispute; and men in every grade and position in society daily and 
habitually acted upon it in their private pursuits, as well as in matters of public 
concern, without doubting for a moment the correctness of this opinion.108 
Ultimately, for Chief Justice Taney, persons of African descent could not 
be citizens because they were regarded by the White race—and not merely by 
White governments—as “beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to 
associate with the white race.”109  Racial slavery imputed a stigma of “deepest 
degradation . . . fixed upon the whole race,” free or slave.110  In short, Taney 
argued that social norms themselves were a bar to becoming a part of the 
political community.  The reasoning of Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred 
Scott is rooted in the philosophical and social dimensions of citizenship.  If 
Congress were to reverse this opinion in a meaningful way, it would require 
more than a grant of national citizenship in law, it would require the power to 
intervene in the social structures and institutions that shape the meaning of that 
citizenship in fact.111 
And thus, with the substantive guarantees of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, 
and Fifteenth Amendments and the enforcement provisions therein, Congress 
sought to overturn Dred Scott not just in law, but in fact.112  The Civil Rights 
Acts of 1866113 and 1875114  were clear that Congress was creating 
 
 107. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 418–21. 
 108. Id. at 407 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 409. 
 111. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 34–37 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).  Justice Harlan 
elaborated this view in his lone dissent in the Civil Rights Cases, describing the fundamental 
transformation of nationhood wrought by the Citizenship Clause.  Id. 
 112. These Amendments not only prohibited slavery, but extended equal protection, due 
process, and a right to vote. 
 113. Indeed, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 protected the right to “enforce contracts, to sue, be 
parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal 
property and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and 
property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”   Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1982). 
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asymmetrical provisions, laws that would reach beyond a narrow view of 
public space.  In fact, the President vetoed the former, in part, because he said 
it went too far, reaching private conduct as well as public action.115  
Eventually, the Supreme Court overturned the latter for the same reason.116  
The impetus behind these measures was that the restructuring of society was 
not simply to occur in the public space conceived narrowly, but that granting 
citizenship and membership in fact was to spur change in our social culture.  
Accordingly, the Reconstruction program was remarkable for its breadth, a 
“blueprint for a social revolution.”117  If there were doubts whether the 
Reconstruction Amendments extended only civil rights, those doubts 
evaporated with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment.118  Given the 
multiplicity of constitutional Amendments and congressional activity taking 
aim at Taney’s opinion, it should not be surprising that Dred Scott has been 
called “the most frequently overturned decision in history.”119  Even today that 
work remains unfinished.  In the 1870s, this project was stillborn. 
The unfinished and abortive program of Reconstruction that ended with the 
Tilden Hayes compromise was a license for the Court to breathe “new life into 
Taney’s racial doctrine.”120  A series of decisions in the 1870s Waite Court 
through the end of the century systematically reversed or undermined the 
Reconstruction program.121  Three decisions in particular stand out as major 
reversals to the architecture of the Reconstruction Constitution.  The most 
infamous of these judgments was the Plessy v. Ferguson holding that the 
doctrine of “separate but equal” protecting a racial caste system was consistent 
with Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.122  That decision, 
however, was the culmination of decades of retrogression.  In 1883, the Court 
overturned the Civil Rights Act of 1875 for reaching into the public sphere, 
 
 114. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1982); Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 115. ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1863–1877 113 (1990).  “His 
veto message repudiated both the specific terms of the Civil Rights Bill and its underlying 
principle.  The assertion of national power to protect blacks’ civil rights, he insisted, ‘violated our 
experience as a people.’ . . . Johnson even invoked the specter of racial intermarriage as the 
logical consequence of Congressional policy.”  Id. 
 116. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 117. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 581. 
 118. In 1869, Congress approved the Fifteenth Amendment protecting suffrage for Black 
men.  U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
 119. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 580 (quoting RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 
21 (Derrick A. Bell, Jr., ed., 1973)). 
 120. Id. at 582. 
 121. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); United States v. Harris, 106 
U.S. 629 (1883); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 
(1896). 
 122. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544. 
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beyond the domain of state action.123  The deep restructuring envisioned by the 
Radical Republicans of the Reconstruction Era was being undermined and 
systematically reversed.  The grant of citizenship was being hollowed out.  
However, the arguably most destructive decision had come earlier still. 
The overworked Equal Protection Clause dominates the jurisprudence of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and yet, in view of the architects of the 
Amendment, it is arguably third in importance.  The most important element of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was the grant of national citizenship.  The second 
sentence then lays out substantive prohibitions on state action: 
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 124 
If the order of place signals relative importance, then the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause is the most important protection afforded under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  It is also the only protection that explicitly inheres to 
citizens and citizens alone—a fact that could not have escaped the Framers 
who bestowed birthright citizenship only a sentence beforehand.  The reason 
this pivotal phrase escapes the notice of most lawyers and many law students is 
that the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been relegated to the 
constitutional dustbin, eviscerated in 1877 by the Supreme Court in the 
Slaughterhouse Cases.125  Because of its far reaching implications 
Slaughterhouse has been described as the worst case in U.S. history. 126 
In Slaughterhouse, the Supreme Court first took up the task of interpreting 
these words.  The plaintiffs claimed that a Louisiana statute regulating the 
operation of slaughterhouses violated the privileges or immunities of national 
citizenship.127  In rejecting that claim, the Court set out the following analytical 
framework: Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment distinguishes between 
national and state citizenship.128  The Privileges or Immunities Clause only 
protects the privileges and immunities that accrue to national citizenship.129  
The question then became: What might those privileges and immunities be?  
 
 123. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14.   Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act reads: “That 
all persons within the jurisidiction of the . . . .”  Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335, 
invalidated by The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 3. 
 124. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 125. 83 U.S. at 51–55. 
 126. BLACK, supra note 96, at 55 (1997). 
 127. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 43–44. 
 128. Id. at 72, 74. 
 129. Id. at 74 (holding “it is only [the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United 
States] which are placed . . . under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and [the privileges 
and immunities of the citizen of the State] are not intended to have any additional protection 
by . . . the amendment”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] LITTLE ROCK AND THE LEGACY OF DRED SCOTT 1173 
Since that question had not yet been determined, the Court began by examining 
antebellum case law which previously defined the privileges and immunities of 
state citizenship.  The Court found these to be basically civil rights of free 
men.130  The Court then concluded that the Privileges or Immunities Clause 
could not have been intended to transfer protection of these rights to the federal 
government because it would be “so great a departure from the spirit and 
structure of the institutions.”131  To assuage fears that in so holding the Court 
would render the clause meaningless, the Court went onto to enumerate those 
things that the clause did protect.132  The Court listed those things that were 
already protected by the Constitution before the Fourteenth Amendment or that 
were necessary or incident to national citizenship.133  Thus, the Court ignored 
the radical transfer that the Fourteenth Amendment undertook and obliterated 
the substantive content of the privileges or immunities of national citizenship.  
As Justice Field explained in dissent, “[i]f this inhibition . . . refers, as held by 
the majority of the court in their opinion, to such privileges and immunities as 
were before its adoption specially designated in the Constitution or necessarily 
implied as belonging to citizens of the United States, it was a vain and idle 
enactment, which accomplished nothing, and most unnecessarily excited 
Congress and the people on its passage.”134  The Court not only rendered the 
 
 130. Id. at 76. 
“The inquiry,” he says, “is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens of the 
several States?  We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges 
and immunities which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free 
governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several States 
which compose this Union, from the time of their becoming free, independent, and 
sovereign.  What these fundamental principles are, it would be more tedious than difficult 
to enumerate.  They may all, however, be comprehended under the following general 
heads: protection by the government, with the right to acquire and possess property of 
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject, nevertheless, to such 
restraints as the government may prescribe for the general good of the whole.” 
Id. (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. Cir. Ct. 371 (1823)). 
 131. Id. at 78. 
 132. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 79–81. 
 133. Justice Miller lists: (1) the right to come to the seat of the U.S. government to assert any 
claim he may have upon that government; (2) the right of free access to its seaports, subtreasuries, 
land offices, and courts of justice of the United States; (3) the right to demand the care and 
protection of the federal government over his life, liberty and property when on high seas or 
within jurisdiction of a foreign government; (4) the right to peaceably assemble and petition for 
redress of grievances, the privilege of writ of habeas corpus; and (5) the right of a citizen of the 
United States to, by his own volition, become a citizen of any state of the Union by a bona fide 
residence therein, with the same rights as any other citizens of that state. 
Id. at 79–80.  Even if those rights enumerated by Justice Miller are not exclusive or were not 
previously protected, they are certainly not of the character that would seem to excite such energy 
as to motivate the crafting and passage of such an important Amendment. 
 134. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting). 
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Privileges or Immunities Clause dead constitutional writ, but it also 
understated the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment as a whole and its 
importance within the Constitution, in effect reversing much of what the 
Fourteenth Amendment had attempted to do. 
The notion, then, that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to perform 
most of the Reconstruction agenda of the Fourteenth Amendment is simply 
wrong.  It is through the lens of Dred Scott that we come to understand that the 
reordering of national identity and citizenship had an important corollary: It 
drew those privileges and immunities that had previously been the domain of 
state citizenship into the sphere of national citizenship. 
It is not just Chief Justice Taney’s racialist vision that was re-inscribed by 
the Court in reversing the work of Reconstruction, though this vision has now 
been partially repudiated as a consequence of Brown.  Chief Justice Taney’s 
understanding of dual citizenship was re-inscribed by Justice Miller in 
Slaughterhouse, and remains quite lively today.135  It recognizes federal 
citizenship while rendering its content empty.  Chief Justice Taney’s 
concomitant constitutional modus operandi, protecting the worst in a 
nationalist model, has been revived as well: It deploys federal grounds to 
prevent state and local governments from addressing or remedying racial 
harms. 
Justice Curtis, in his dissent in Dred Scott, was the constitutional 
conservative.  In his view, national citizenship derived from state 
citizenship.136  If a state recognized Black citizenship, then it followed that he 
or she was also a citizen of the United States.  In contrast, Chief Justice Taney 
articulated a much broader view of national citizenship in Dred Scott, an 
understanding of the Constitution that was anything but deferential to local 
government.  His ruling barred local governments in the territories from 
deciding for themselves whether slavery could be prohibited.137  He also took 
away authority of states to make free Blacks citizens and thereby national 
citizens.  A state, even a slave state, could not make a person of African 
descent into a citizen of the United States.  To see the handiwork of this mode 
of constitutional operation today, one need look no further than the plurality 
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
Dist. No. 1, in which the Court uses the Equal Protection Clause as a bar to 
efforts by local school boards to address racial isolation.138 
In terms of our jurisprudence, in many respects we have reverted to a pre-
Civil War constitutional understanding and selectively chosen elements of the 
 
 135. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 22, at 583. 
 136. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 580–81 (1856) (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
 137. See id. at 452–53 (opinion of the Court). 
 138. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. 
Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007); infra Part III. 
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Fourteenth Amendment for enforcement.  With the exception of the reversal of 
Plessy, the conclusions of Slaughterhouse and the Civil Rights Cases remain 
substantially intact.  As a consequence, our view of the Fourteenth Amendment 
remains unjustifiably narrow.139  Americans of all political persuasions, and 
most critically legal advocates, have not fully grasped the fact that we have 
two imperfectly realized Constitutions: The pre-Civil War Constitution, where 
certainly among other things federalism is robustly embraced, and a post-Civil 
War Constitution that gives us, if anything, a different form of federalism and a 
different notion of citizenship.  The Reconstruction Amendments sought to 
remake the Constitution into a new document for a new people.  The slippage 
that followed the Reconstruction Amendments, especially following the end of 
Reconstruction and culminating in Plessy, systematically stripped their content 
and undermined their force.  Americans inchoately recognize the tension—one 
that is often framed in terms of federalism concerns—and struggle to reconcile 
a strong, patriotic national identity with a politics that mythologizes states 
rights and a limited federal government. 
III.  NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES 
The discordant voices on both sides of the voluntary integration cases in 
the Seattle and Jefferson County School Districts illustrate the division 
engendered by the post-Reconstruction Supreme Court’s interpretive legacy of 
the Fourteenth Amendment set against the clear aspiration of its framers.140  
The Court struck down limited race-conscious integration plans as a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the 
explicit use of racial classifications in student assignment.141  Chief Justice 
Roberts, writing for the plurality, distinguishes between segregation that is a 
product of state action and segregation that may be the product of residential 
housing patterns.142  In the Chief Justice’s view, it is only state-enforced 
segregation that triggers the constitutional injury that permits the use of racial 
classifications as a remedy.143  Furthermore, Justice Thomas, in his concurring 
opinion, describes de facto segregation as being “natural,”144 which can also 
result from any number of innocent private decisions, including voluntary 
 
 139. Although the Equal Protection Clause is one of the most litigated sections of the 
Constitution, it was used more frequently in the late nineteenth century to protect capital interests 
rather than descendants of slaves.  The Section 2 apportionment provision of the Fifteenth 
Amendment has never seen use. 
 140. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2746–50. 
 141. See id. 
 142. Id. at 2761. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 2773. 
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housing choices.145  Consider, in contrast, the language of Justice Breyer’s 
impassioned dissent: 
[Brown] was a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to make 
citizens of slaves.  It was the promise of true racial equality—not as a matter of 
fine words on paper, but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation’s cities and 
schools.  It was about the nature of a democracy that must work for all 
Americans.  It sought one law, one Nation, one people, not simply as a matter 
of legal principle but in terms of how we actually live.146 
In Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney reasoned that Blacks were not and 
could never be citizens because they were not considered worthy, even when 
free, by the dominant race.  Overturning Chief Justice Taney’s holding that 
Blacks were not citizens in law was not enough if the social relations that 
underpinned the lived experience of that legal status did not follow with it.  
Justice Breyer perceives this distinction when he writes that citizenship must 
be more than a matter of “legal principle”; it must speak to us in terms of how 
“we actually live.”147  Although the Reconstruction Congress attempted to 
enforce this vision with robust proposals reaching into social life, the Court 
issued a series of reversals, most prominently in the trio of cases described in 
Part II.148  At the very moment that citizenship was now drawn into the federal 
sphere, it was suddenly vacuous.149  The Court regarded congressional 
attempts to remake social relations as going beyond the bounds of 
congressional authority, reaching beyond state action and into the private 
sphere.150 
This is also, therefore, a debate over the validity and limits of individual 
action and private choice.  The plurality refuses to prioritize the interest in 
creating integrated living and educational environments over the right of White 
parents to segregate their children.  The dissenting Justices, and Justice 
Kennedy in concurrence, would recognize this interest as sufficiently 
important to justify racial classifications, so long as they are narrowly 
tailored.151  This debate over individual choice is not new.  The legitimacy of 
Brown was interposed in precisely those terms. 
Herbert Wechsler’s famous article on “neutral principles” argued that the 
Brown decision could not be grounded in “neutral principles” because there 
 
 145. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2769. 
 146. Id. at 2836 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
 149. This was a consequence of the Slaughterhouse decision.  See supra Part II, notes 74, 92–
96, and accompanying text. 
 150. This is the message of the Civil Rights Cases.  See supra note 116 and accompanying 
text. 
 151. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct 2800 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Id. at 2794–97 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
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was no principled basis for choosing African American associational rights to 
an integrated education over the right of Southern Whites to not associate with 
African Americans.152  He framed the question in terms of two injuries: the 
forced segregation of Blacks and the forced integration of Whites.  His critique 
of Brown went beyond a critique of the famous footnote 11 doll experiment, 
which demonstrated the psychological harms of segregation.153  If you could 
prove to Wechsler that Blacks were injured by segregation, that evidence 
would not have changed his conclusion.  Even if you could validate that injury, 
there remains another injury consequent from forced integration; and it is not 
clear how the Court may choose in a neutral way to prioritize, as a 
constitutional matter, one injury over another. 
This is the wrong debate because it is the wrong question.  The 
Reconstruction Amendments were not designed to be neutral.  They were 
intended to carry certain values about citizenship, membership, and political 
identity in the republic.  The question of neutral principles is also wrong as a 
strict jurisprudential matter.  Herbert Wechsler’s critique was framed as a First 
Amendment associational question.154  That is a mischaracterization of Brown.  
Brown was part of the overthrow of an unequal caste system.  The search for 
neutral principles assumes symmetry in the relations between Blacks and 
Whites.  The violence in Cooper belies that notion.  While equality as a 
principle may be value neutral, the Fourteenth Amendment is not. 
The substantive core of the Fourteenth Amendment is a guarantee of equal 
citizenship to former slaves and the descendant’s of slaves.  The ancient 
Greeks understood that the political community was formed to share in the 
“good life.” 155  Equality in the political community meant “the opportunity for 
full participation as a respected member of the community.”156  At least two 
forms of equality were necessary to achieve this end.  Arithmetic equality, 
“that which is the same and equal in number or dimension,” is context free, 
formal equality. 157  Arithmetic equality is recognizable in the principle, “one 
person, one vote.”  Geometric equality, “when the first stands in the same 
relation to the second as the second to the third,” accounts for differing 
positions.  Where people are differently situated, it would be unjust to treat 
them the same.  Geometric equality is contextual and results in the greatest 
good.  Aristotle, who discussed the two kinds of equality at greatest length, 
 
 152. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 31–35 (1959). 
 153. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 n.11 (1954). 
 154. See Wechsler, supra note 152, at 29. 
 155. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of Equality, 
12 LAW & INEQ. 381, 384 (1994). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. at 419–21. 
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emphasized the need for both.158  However, when we talk about equality today, 
and certainly when the Roberts Court talks about equality, there is an implicit 
rejection of the principle of contextual equality, saying that context does not 
bear on the constitutional principle.159  Thus, Chief Justice Roberts writes that 
“the way to stop discrimination . . . is to stop discriminating”160 implying that 
the forced segregation of Linda Brown is equivalent to the forced integration 
of Joshua McDonald. 
The Reconstruction Amendments were deeply contextual.  They sought to 
bring those who had been slaves into the political community.  The Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 speaks explicitly of extending the “same right[s] . . . as 
[are] enjoyed by white citizens.”161  The view in the Reconstruction Congress 
was that there was an asymmetry between Whites and non-Whites.  Although 
only one of the three Reconstruction Amendments specifically references 
persons of African descent through the mention of race and condition of prior 
servitude, the Supreme Court in its earliest review of those Amendments 
recognized a “unity of purpose” behind them:162 
[I]n the light of this recapitulation of events, almost too recent to be called 
history, but which are familiar to us all; and on the most casual examination of 
the language of these amendments, no one can fail to be impressed with the 
one pervading purpose found in them all, lying at the foundation of each, and 
without which none of them would have been even suggested; we mean the 
freedom of the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that freedom, 
and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions 
of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.163 
Under the light of the Fourteenth Amendment, the question of individual 
choice, of “innocent private decisions, including voluntary housing choices,”164 
may be best understood as a debate over the right to secede from communal 
arrangements.  The “secessionist impulse” has considerable pedigree in our 
political tradition.165  The founding act of the nation, in declaring independence 
 
 158. Id. at 421. 
 159. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2767–68 (2007).  The Court ignored at least some contextual differences, for example, the 
Chief Justice equated the assignment of school children here with the system of Jim Crow racial 
segregation. 
 160. Id. at 2768. 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1991). 
 162. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 67 (1872). 
 163. Id. at 71. 
 164. Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2769. 
 165. Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 
458 (1984). 
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from Great Britain, endorsed this proposition with its opening volley.166  The 
Civil War again posed the question of whether some members of a political 
community could free themselves from that arrangement by seceding.  The 
outcome of the Civil War resolved this question in favor of President Lincoln’s 
theory of national union and against the secessionists.167  In that sense, the 
Civil War was a war to save the Union by denying the right to leave as an “act 
of autonomous choice.”168  The Civil War marked the repudiation of the 
secessionist principle, and the Civil War Amendments gave federal courts a 
central role in enforcing the terms of that repudiation.169 
Plessy renounced that principle and permitted people who were supposed 
to be joined together in community to break those relations through a doctrine 
of “separate but equal.”170  It was then that Blacks and Whites ate at different 
restaurants, drank from different fountains, traveled in different ends of a bus, 
lived in different neighborhoods, were prohibited from marrying, and attended 
different schools.  Brown re-imposed “communal bonds” between Whites and 
Blacks.171  When Whites resisted this arrangement, they did so in primarily 
two ways.  First, they sought to use freedom-of-choice remedies that would 
ostensibly remove the state actor from the equation.  Secondly, they withdrew 
from the public sphere.  Rather than integrate, many Southern school boards 
shuttered up.  Public pools closed.  Public space shrank.  Finally, Southerners 
argued that the Supreme Court could not tell state actors what to do.  In 
Cooper, the Supreme Court emphatically rejected both assertions.172  It 
unequivocally stated that the supremacy of the Constitution over all state 
action was beyond question.  But it demanded obedience not simply from the 
state, but also from the defiant White community, 
De facto segregation is a continuation of the fight over claim for the right 
to secede.  In Cooper, the Supreme Court rejected the right of the White 
community to secede from communal relationship with Blacks through 
freedom-of-choice plans.  Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court has moved 
away from that position.  It has rejected the claim of integration over the right 
of Whites to be free from integration plans first in Milliken and up through 
 
 166. “When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve 
the political bands which have connected them with another . . . .”  THE DECLARATION OF 
INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 167. Burt, supra note 165, at 459 n.12. 
 168. Id. at  458–59. 
 169. Id. at 464. 
 170. Id. at 459. 
 171. Id. at 457. 
 172. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958). 
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Parents Involved.173  In Milliken v. Bradley, the Supreme Court reversed a 
ruling that had ordered cross-district busing with suburban schools to remedy 
proven racial discrimination by the Detroit public school district.174  The lower 
court based its decision on the fact that Detroit could not desegregate without 
an inter-district remedy, and the fact that Whites were complicit in inner-city 
school segregation by moving to the suburbs mainly to avoid sending their 
children to Detroit schools.175  The Supreme Court ruled that an inter-district 
remedy was improper in the absence of evidence of de jure segregation or a 
finding that the district boundaries were drawn with the purpose of fostering 
segregation.176  Thus, the case became a political redline, slowing momentum 
toward school integration and sanctioning White flight, by putting suburbs on 
notice that they could develop local school systems with little fear that they 
would have to participate in integration plans.  In Parents Involved, the Court 
raised the bar for school districts attempting to retain and foster integration 
within their district by holding that explicit racial classifications must be used 
only as a last resort in the absence of de jure segregation.177  This decision 
further insulates de facto patterns of neighborhood segregation from the 
tampering of local government. The framing of the question as de facto 
segregation versus de jure segregation simply draws the line where the Court 
will side one way or another in a seemingly neutral way, perhaps in answer to 
Herbert Wechsler. 
IV.  WHAT DEMOCRACY REQUIRES 
Five decades since Brown and Cooper, segregation and racial isolation 
remain pronounced throughout the country and in many instances are 
worsening.  In most metropolitan regions, few truly integrated communities 
can be found.178  In regions with large African American populations, 
segregation is even more extreme.179  Residential segregation (as measured by 
the dissimilarity index) declined by more than twelve points between 1980 and 
2000 in regions that were less than 5% African American, but this decline was 
only six points in regions that were more than 20% African American.180  
 
 173. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 
2738, 2759 (2007) (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1974); Swann v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 24 (1971)). 
 174. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752–53 (1974). 
 175. Id. at 725. 
 176. Id. at 745. 
 177. See Parents Involved, 127 S. Ct. at 2773. 
 178. SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE 
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 17–18 (2004). 
 179. See id.; see also JOHN LOGAN, ETHNIC DIVERSITY GROWS: NEIGHBORHOOD 
INTEGRATION LAGS BEHIND 4 (2001), http://mumford1.dyndns.org/cen2000/report.html. 
 180. LOGAN, supra note 179. 
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Although neighborhood segregation declined slightly in the 1990s, school 
segregation increased.  More Black students attended segregated schools in 
2003 than in 1988.181  School resegregation for Blacks and Latinos has been a 
trend in nearly every large school district since the 1980s.182  In some ways it 
is almost as high as apartheid in South Africa.183  Almost 2.4 million students, 
or about one in six Black and Latino students, attend a school in which the 
student body is 99–100% students of color.184  White students are the most 
isolated group of students in the United States.185  White students, on average, 
attend a school in which only one in five students are of another race although 
they make up less than 60% of the school age population.186  Following a 
series of court decisions between 1991 and 1995, school districts across the 
nation have been released from court-ordered desegregation mandates even 
when resegregation predictably follows.187  Not only does the Fourteenth 
Amendment no longer compel integration, but it has been usurped to curtail 
voluntary efforts to maintain integrated schools. 
In light of these setbacks, a question arises, often in the context of all 
Black or historically Black schools or all women’s schools, about whether 
students might perform better in those schools.  This question complicates the 
discussion and suggests that perhaps de facto segregation, under the right 
conditions and with proper support, is not such a harmful arrangement.188  
 
 181. ANURMINA BHARGAVA, ERICA FRANKENBERG & CHINH Q. LE, STILL LOOKING TO THE 
FUTURE: VOLUNTARY K–12 SCHOOL INTEGRATION, A MANUAL FOR PARENTS, EDUCATORS & 
ADVOCATES 12 (2008). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See the dissimilarity index values in A.J. Christopher, Urban Segregation in Post-
apartheid South Africa, 38 URBAN STUDIES 449, 452 (2001).  See also Barbara Reskin, The 
Discrimination System: Race and Public Policy, slide 4 (Jan. 3, 2004), 
http://faculty.washington.edu/reskin/; Initiative in Spatial Structures in the Social Sciences, 
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cen2000/data.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
 184. BHARGAVA ET AL., supra note 181, at 11. 
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 186. Id.. 
 187. Id. at 7. 
 188. Justice Thomas, in his concurrence in Parents Involved, made this point: 
Add to the inconclusive social science the fact of black achievement in “racially isolated” 
environments.  See T. SOWELL, EDUCATION: ASSUMPTIONS VERSUS HISTORY 7–38 
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Wesleyan”).  Dunbar is by no means an isolated example.  See id., at 10–32 (discussing 
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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1182 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:1153 
There is a growing belief that “integration is no longer a viable social policy, 
but rather a failed social experiment.”189  At the same time, there is a more 
vocal expression of “integration fatigue” among people of color.  Many Black 
families indicate a preference for places that are recognized as being 
welcoming to Blacks and seem less willing than in the past to be integration 
pioneers and move into neighborhoods that might be hostile to their 
presence.190  These arguments, however, confuse large legal principles with the 
question of the appropriate remedy to a legal injury. 
There are a number of reasons why marginalized populations perform 
better in homogenous schools.  In many institutions that are not all Black, there 
is a hostile environment or a stereotype threat.191  There remain constant 
assaults, subtle and not so subtle, on women and Blacks in heterogeneous 
institutions.192  Part of the problem is that what has been understood and sold 
as integration has not been genuine integration.193  Even where Black and 
White students attend the same school, they are often tracked into separate 
classrooms.194  Today, there is a gross overrepresentation of African American 
and Hispanic students in the lowest tracks, even after controlling for prior 
measured achievement.195  Low-income students of color are seven times as 
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likely to be in lower track classes as middle-income White students.196  Using 
the justification of stereotype threats or unfair tracking as a justification to give 
up on integration is, in essence, the rationale of the lower court in Cooper that 
these students would just be better off under segregation.197  It sends the 
message that Whites are going to behave badly, so we are better off just 
keeping Blacks out for their own good. 
There remain a number of counter-examples.  Even though integration has 
not been fully realized, there are many places where integration has succeeded 
in narrowing the achievement gap.  In many of the Southern schools, certainly 
Wake County, Blacks perform extremely well.  Under the Wake County 
integration plan, designed to reduce racial isolation,198 Black passage of 
standardized test went from 40% to 80% in the last decade system-wide.199  
The only large school system, with a minor exception, that has completely 
eliminated the Black-White performance gap is the U.S. military.200  It is one 
of our most integrated institutions.201  However, to think of integrated 
education in those limited terms is already problematic. 
One of the central purposes behind the creation of public schooling in the 
United States was to foster good citizenship.202  John Dewey, the great 
educator from the early twentieth century, taught that education in a 
democracy must improve society, increasing opportunities for students to 
escape from the limitations of their socioeconomic environment and “come 
into living contact with a broader environment.”203  Because education is a 
primary vehicle for defining who we are, both individually and socially, it 
breaks down “those barriers of class, race, and national territory which [keep] 
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men from perceiving the full import of their activity.” 204  Today, we think of 
education largely in terms of a private good, a service provided by government 
on behalf of taxpayers.205 
The true underlying importance of equal and integrated education for all in 
our democracy received now waning support in Brown v. Board of Education, 
where Chief Justice Warren described public education as “the most important 
function of state and local governments,” and “the very foundation of good 
citizenship,” enhancing “the performance of our most basic public 
responsibilities.”206  The strong rationale for integration in Brown and later in 
Grutter was a particular conception of democracy and the role of citizenship in 
a democracy.207  As Justice O’Connor wrote on behalf of the Court, “[w]e have 
repeatedly acknowledged the overriding importance of preparing students for 
work and citizenship, describing education as pivotal to ‘sustaining our 
political and cultural heritage’ with a fundamental role in maintaining the 
fabric of society.”208  This language is a shift in the Court’s focus on the 
individual good education fulfills towards a conception of education deriving 
its fundamental importance from the fact that it serves the common good.  
Even Justice Thomas recognizes a connection between education and the civic 
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.  In his view, education is a vital 
component in securing the “civic, political, and personal freedoms conferred 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”209  The Court in Grutter wrote about 
“effective participation” and the legitimacy of our democracy.210  This 
democratic element was picked up by Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion 
in Parents Involved: “It is an interest in teaching children to engage in the kind 
of cooperation among Americans of all races that is necessary to make a land 
of three hundred million people one Nation.”211  The need for integration is 
greater than ever as we approach a school age population in the United States 
where students of color are 45%.212  The military brief in Grutter discusses the 
need for diversity as a matter of national security.213 
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Martin Luther King, Jr., understood that segregation was evil not just 
because of what it did to Blacks, but what it did to Whites as well.  It “scars the 
soul of both the segregated and the segregator. . . .  It gives the segregated a 
false sense of inferiority, and it gives the segregator a false sense of 
superiority.”214  It is not enough that all children learn to read and write.  The 
challenge we face is the challenge of becoming effective citizens in the most 
diverse country in human history.  It is small wonder that Justice O’Connor 
reasserted the fundamental principle espoused in Brown that “education . . . is 
the very foundation of good citizenship.”215  Segregation makes it very 
difficult to develop good citizens, White or Black.  If we fail at this, the 
country fails as a nation.  It is an amazing thing that we now tell school 
districts in Seattle and Louisville, not only are you not required to integrate 
schools, you are not allowed to integrate schools. 
As Dewey, Brown, and Grutter understood, education is fundamentally 
about citizenship and democracy.  The prize at stake is not how well Black 
kids learn, but the constitution of White identity and membership.  Segregation 
undermines the project of community building, and by extension, nation 
building.  The racial isolation of Whites in separate schools, reinforced by the 
lived experience of segregated neighborhoods, creates a sense of separateness 
and difference from people of a different color, who do not seem to be a part of 
the same community or share the same values.  It is not surprising, then, that 
Americans live in a cultural climate that emphasizes individual success and 
self-interest over the common good; where values such as civility and mutual 
respect are displaced by excessive individualism. 
As Blacks in the United States increased their claims to citizenship and the 
rights of citizenships, the meaning and substance of citizenship has narrowed.  
The grant of national citizenship following the Civil War was a fixed legal 
status, but the Reconstruction Amendments gave Congress authority to pass 
laws to protect the substance of that status.  No sooner had the ink dried on that 
document then the fullness of that promise proved illusory.  The basic 
citizenship privileges and freedoms that were so richly conceived in the 
antebellum period evaporated in the wake of Reconstruction.  When a second 
claim to those rights was advanced during the Civil Rights Movement a 
century later, federal courts proved more accommodating.  This time public 
space itself dissipated as Whites fled, leaving little room for the exercise of 
those rights.  Today, it is not simply that public space has been shriveling; it 
has been under a generation of sustained conservative attack, including calls to 
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privatize education.  Robert Putnam attributes a general decline in civic 
engagement from the 1960s, which he characterizes a nation in which its 
citizens are “increasingly solitary and mutually mistrustful,” to television and 
generational change.216  The more obvious explanation is the changing nature 
of the community to which Blacks have made a claim for full membership.  
Rather than accommodate those claims, Whites moved into exclusive suburbs 
in large numbers and retreated into private worlds. 
The ancient Greek conception of citizenship as a way of life, as active 
participation in governance of common affairs, gave way in time to a very 
different concept of citizenship under Roman government.217  This form of 
citizenship was a passive legal status, carrying a bundle of rights and imposing 
some duties.218  This form of citizenship-as-status was partly a product of 
Roman imperial expansion, which was based less on the use of force and more 
on granting the status of Roman citizenship to conquered peoples.219  Thus, 
dual citizenship emerged—citizenship to the city of birth and to the empire.  
However, Roman citizenship was not an empty gesture.  Roman citizenship 
was a valuable protection that allowed free and unhindered movement across 
the empire, protection from foreign and local enemies, and stimulated peaceful 
trade.220  Justice Miller’s exposition of the rights and privileges that flow from 
national citizenship in Slaughterhouse marks a similar transition.  When listing 
those privileges and immunities that accrue from the new grant of national 
citizenship he lists: “the right to come to the seat of government,” “the right of 
free access to its seaport”, “[the right] to demand care and protection of the 
Federal government over his life, liberty and property when on the high seas or 
within the jurisdiction of a foreign government,” and “[t]he right to use the 
navigable waters of the United States.”221  No sooner had citizenship been 
nationalized and broadened than the content of that citizenship dramatically 
emptied.222 
Citizenship is not simply a vertical relationship between individual citizens 
and the state.  It is primarily a horizontal relationship of citizens to other 
citizens in the governance of common affairs.  If membership in democracy, 
defined as citizenship, is merely a passive status, conferring rights and some 
duties, then the meaning of citizenship as active participation in common 
governance and membership in the American political community is lost.  
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Citizenship as the “mutual recognition of equals participating in a shared life 
and sharing in the operation of their own life” cannot work within the confines 
of an atomized, individualized mass society.223  The citizen as a solitary 
consumer is a citizen without a civic context.  Public education is the chief 
domain in which government may hope to instill civic virtues, including the 
sense of linked fate and interconnectedness across racial boundaries.  In that 
context, it is inconceivable that as we move to a more pluralistic, diverse 
society that we can have the kind of society we want and need and that the 
Reconstruction Amendments and Brown prefigured while we remain separate 
and unequal. 
CONCLUSION 
Brown v. Board of Education has sometimes been referred to as a “Dred 
Scott decision in reverse” to connote disdain for activism in the judicial branch 
of government.224  There is unintended wisdom in the notion that Brown was 
Dred Scott in reverse.  Dred Scott transformed the uncertain, ambiguous 
character of American citizenship and inscribed in law a definite status of 
which persons of African descent could have no part.  Brown and her progeny 
can be understood as part of the process of reversing that understanding. 
In his Pulitzer Prize winning opus on Dred Scott, Don Fehrenbacher 
situates the case in the broadest possible American context.  After meticulously 
tracing the interweaving flow of events, ideas, and actors that lead up to the 
infamous decision, he concludes that Dred Scott is “a point of illumination, 
casting light upon more than a century of American” law and politics.225  Just 
as that history extends backward to the founding and beyond, so does it move 
forward, far beyond the confines of the nineteenth and even twentieth 
centuries. 
From our vantage point, Dred Scott casts a light upon the darkened 
shadows of the Fourteenth Amendment and impels us to reclaim our 
constitutional legacy.  Dred Scott illuminates our constitutional missteps, from 
the interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause and Enforcement 
Provisions to the unjustifiably limited view of constitutional significance we 
accord the Reconstruction trilogy.  The Fourteenth Amendment was more than 
a new amendment.  It was a new act of constituting—it was a revised compact 
between the states and the federal government that redefined the relationship 
between the two. 
Brown is, if anything, the framers intended application of the 
Reconstruction provisions upon a caste system first instituted in law with 
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slavery and reasserted with shocking vigor under Jim Crow.  The promise of 
Brown is nothing if not the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Where the 
Court in Brown spoke in principle and acted sluggishly to enforce its verdict, 
Cooper marked an emphatic pronouncement about the supremacy of the 
communitarian arrangements and the limits of individual choice.  Cooper most 
vividly represents the cluster of decisions which, even more than Brown, 
rejected the right of secession, the right of Whites to withdraw from communal 
relationship.  Brown exposed the pernicious fiction of “separate but equal” and 
overturned state-sponsored segregation but said little about scheme that would 
replace it.  It was Cooper and related cases that took a step further and required 
integration by denying Whites the freedom to opt out.  While many would be 
quick to characterize Cooper as a case more about judicial supremacy or 
constitutional powers than a statement about the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
vision of political community, this is a false dichotomy.  It is the exercise of 
judicial power and symbolic authority as a response to a claim of a right of 
secession that gives full meaning to Cooper. 
As the expositor of our Constitution, the Supreme Court is the voice of that 
instrument and speaks to a political community defined by that instrument.  In 
turn, the Court is also a force for re-constituting that community, just as it was 
in Dred Scott.  A year before the Court’s decision in Cooper, the President had 
already sent federal troops into Little Rock to countermand Governor Faubus’s 
action.226  No court had ordered this action or had the authority to order the 
President to undertake this action.227  Nonetheless, President Eisenhower 
clothed his decision in the authority of the Court’s decision in Brown, even 
while he went so far as to imply that he personally may have disagreed with 
the decision.228  As a practical matter, the Little Rock crisis had already been 
resolved.  The Court could have simply declined to step in, relying on the 
Eighth Circuit decision below229 and the presidential intervention to maintain 
the peace and uphold the rule of law.  Instead, in a stunning rebuke, the Court 
spoke with a “declamatory rhetoric” that left little doubt about its message or 
its symbolism.230  To emphasize its point, the Court abandoned the custom of 
labeling a single opinion which garners majority support of the Justices as “the 
opinion of the Court.”  Instead, in Cooper, the Court authored a single opinion 
which listed each of the individual Justices by name.231  This served to 
underscore both the unanimity of the decision as well as the weight of each 
Justice’s strength in support of the opinion.  In truth, the Court has no 
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mechanism for enforcing its decision.  It must rely upon the executive branch 
to execute the law.  Although neither the Justices nor the Court itself can 
command our devotion, they do command our attention.  This is the most 
important aspect of the Court’s decision in Cooper.  The moral vision of 
communal membership reinforced by the boldness of the Court’s action in 
responding to the crisis is the spiritual message of the Reconstruction 
Amendments.  It is a message that we must heed in the turmoil over the 
debates over immigration, amidst a cultural climate that favors individualism 
and consumerism over mutual respect and civic engagement, at a time growing 
resegregation in our neighborhoods and urban areas, and as the United States 
moves to a “majority-minority” nation.232  It is a legacy we can no longer 
ignore. 
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